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Abstract
Little attention has been given to the link between variation in a firm’s circumstances and the
resolution ofagencyproblems that pervade therelationshipbetween a firm and its employees. We
constructstochastic versions ofstandard efficiency-wage and performance-bonding models and find
that this connection has important and apparently inescapable consequences: (1) Compensation
levelsdepend on characteristics ofthe firm. (2) Thepossibility ofthe firm’s exit drives an important
prediction in both classes ofmodel: compensation rises in dying firms. (3)The firm’s exit decision
maybe distorted. These result illustratesthe needforcareful attention to the circumstances under
which valuablejobs are liquidated.
Joseph A. Ritter Lowell J. Taylor
Research Officer Heinz School ofPublic Policy
Federal ReserveBank ofSt. Louis and Management
411 Locust Street Carnegie Mellon University
St. Louis, MO 63102 Pittsburgh, PA 15213
We thank Rob Dittmar and Bill Emmons forhelpful comments and discussions.Agency problems pervade the relationship between employers and employees.
Merely paying a worker the amount she requires to forego leisure today does not
typically guarantee that her behavior in the workplace will maximize the profits
of the firm. This tension between allocative and productive efficiency forms the
basis for several models of compensation, including tournaments, tenure-earnings
profiles, and efficiency-wage models, The hallmark ofthese approaches is that firms
use various mechanisms to give workers’ jobs positive value.
These models generally incorporate exogenous separation at a fixed rate, cap-
turing in a crudewaythe ideathat the stabilityofthejob affects the level ofobserved
compensation. Little attention has been given to the link between variation in the
firm’s circumstances and its compensation policies. Theories connecting agency
problems and compensation typically consider dismissal only in connection with
its use as a trigger strategy or “worker discipline device” (Lazear, 1981; Shapiro
and Stiglitz, 1984). But, of course, when a firm’s circumstances change, it may
need to dismiss employees for reasons not connected with worker discipline. We ar-
gue here that this simple observation has important and inescapable consequences
for understanding how compensation schemes (theories) function when the firm’s
environment is stochastic.
In a previous paper (Ritter and Taylor, 1994) we demonstrated that uncer-
tainty and private information about the firm’s future—and therefore the future
ofjobs—could change the equilibrium compensation scheme. In this paper we fol-
low a more direct course, constructing models which describe explicitly the links
between uncertainty in a firm’s environment and its compensation policy. Firms
facestochastic demand or productivity shocks and simultaneously determine wages,
labor demand, and exit.
In subsequent sections we construct a model of compensation for a monopo-
listically competitive firm that faces stochastic demand or productivity. A simple
1asset-pricing structure links the firm’s prospects with compensation structures that
resolve agency problems by making jobs valuable. In particular, we study efficiency-
wage and performance-bonding models that are nested in a more general model. In
both cases workers’ jobs have positive value, and our main purpose is to illustrate
features which derive from this characteristic. While standard deterministic ver-
sions of these models predict that compensation will depend on characteristics of
the job and worker, the stochastic versions we study demonstrate that observed
levels of compensation also depend systematically on characteristics of the firm and
its environment, even when firms can effectively use bonding strategies.
The performance-bonding version of our model highlights the equivalence be-
tween the efficiency ofbonding solutions and the conditions required forstrict adher-
ence to Modigliani-Miller propositions. (Many criticisms of the bonding approach
to regulating workers’ behavior amount to claims that the strict conditions do not
hold.) In contrast, efficiency-wage models explicitly assume the existence of fric-
tions that block a first-best solution. Consequently, efficiency wages systematically
distort the firms’ actions on dimensions other than wages and employment.
The most striking commonality between the bonding and efficiency-wage mod-
els is that in “bad” states of the world (weak demand or low productivity) the rate
of return on the job—the efficiency wage premium or return on the performance
bond—must rise to compensate the worker for potential loss of the capital value of
the job. To put it bluntly, it is difficult to give high value to a job that is likely to
vanish in the near future. This observation puts clear restrictions on the returns
that must be promised on bonds, raising observed compensation (which includes re-
payment ofbonds) in bad states. In efficiency-wage models wages must rise rapidly
as the firm nears exit. It is important to note that this phenomenon is not a man-
ifestation of risk aversion (which is not present in our model), but rather a robust
implication of the internal economic logic of models that resolve agency issues by
2attaching value to jobs.
A consequence of the need to maintain a job’s value in bad states is that when
it is costly to do so—as it is in efficiency-wage models—the firm’s exit decision is
distorted in a particularly interesting way: The firm shuts down when the value
of ownership claims drops to zero, but this occurs when the firm still has some
residual value embedded in workers’ claims to a stream of wage premiums. (A firm
that could costlessly resolve its agency problems would not shut down in this state.)
The information asymmetry that generates the agency problem in the first place
makes it impossible to preserve this valuethrough simple transfers between workers
and the firm. Employers and employees are in the difficult position of seeking to
structure worker concessions that continue to satisfy incentive constraints. In the
final section of the paper we turn to the issue of how the residual value found in a
dying firm can trigger a struggle to find ways to preserve that value.
1. AN EFFORT-REGULATION MODEL
Many models of compensation rely on some form of performance bonding.
Bonding, where possible, allows the firm to reproduce the allocations of the neo-
classical model in the face of various agency problems. In Lazear’s (1981) model
oftenure-earnings profiles, for example, the average wage over the worker’s lifetime
and average value ofmarginal product equal the spot market wage. Efficiency-wage
models start from the premise that bonding can onlypartly solve the firm’s agency
problems. Ifthe agency problem is serious enough to make a costly solution worth-
while, the firm pays a wage that exceeds the spot market wage at every date. Thus
firms should prefer bonding where it is feasible. But various arguments against
universal applicability of bonding have been advanced. See, for example, Akerlof
and Katz (1989), Dickens, Katz, and Lang (1989), and Ritter and Taylor (1994).1
1 If incentive pay can be used effectively in a firm, these papers and the present paper
3The model we develop here nests both approaches.
We consider a firm with a work force of infinitely-lived workers. The firm is a
monopolistic competitor facing demand curve
= ~
A~follows an S-state, irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain with transition matrix
M = [~ijj]. We will choose M so that the stochastic process forA~approximates a
stationary, normal AR(1) process. Our model is thus intended to capture a firm’s
response to stationary variation in its environment, not permanent shifts in its
prospects. The values of A are ordered so that A~< A3 if and only if i <j. We
assume that for some values of A the firm is not profitable.
The firm produces output using labor and a fixed amount ofcapital according
to the production function Y = OL~with a < 1. We assume that the capital
requires a fixed rental payment F per period. We assume that the firm hires labor
to the point where the value of marginal product equals the wage:
L — ___
This assumption simplifies our analysis by implicitly ruling out wage and labor
demand policies conditioned on anything beyond the current value of the state
variable A~.Wehave more to say on this subjectbelow. The productivity parameter
0 and A~ enter the problem in a mathematically similar way, so our conclusions also
apply to a model with stochastic production technology where A is constant and 0
follows a Markov chain.2 The firmmay choose to shut down in any state, and faces
neither entry nor exit costs.3
are largely irrelevant, but the difficulties facing incentive-pay systems are manifold
(Gibbons, 1996).
2 ~ the firm is a price taker, a stochastic P and stochastic 0 are mathematically iden-
tical, entering the problem only as
~ Our formulation admits entry and exit costs fairly easily. Although these would
4We adopt a simple effort-regulation setup that allows us to calculate the wages
required to solve the firm’s agency problem for an arbitrary level of bonding. In
subsequent sections we examine a pure efficiency-wage case, which assumes that
r~o bonding is possible, and a pure bonding case, which assumes that bonds can
be large enough to solve the agency problem without any efficiency-wage premium.
(The polar cases illustrate the implications of the respective theories. In practice,
however, we believe both approaches can coexist, with efficiency wages used to fill
gaps that, for one reason or another, bonding solutions cannot.) Workers can work
at high or low effort levels, which we normalize to er” and 0, respectively. The
worker’s effort level is not directly observed by the firm. We assume that it is never
profitable for the firm to operate at the low effort level. Workers’ utility per period
is given by w — e where w is the wage and e E {0, e’~’}.Firms and workers share a
common discount factor /3 < 1.
Each date t is divided into five stages:
1. A new state A~ is revealed.
2. The firm sets wage W~ and hires labor L~, laying offworkers as necessary.
3. Performance bonds posted in t — 1, if any, are repaid with interest. New
bonds, if any, are posted.
4. Workers choose effort levels. Production takes place. Wages are paid.
5. The firm receives a signal about the worker’s effort level. Workers are
terminated for cause, as necessary.
If labor demand declines (L3 (t) < L~, (t — 1)), existing workers face permanent
layoff with equal probability.4 Otherwise they are retained. Given demand level A~
add minimal complexity they seem unlikely to interact in an interesting way with
the problem of designing compensation policies. Their addition would, however,
complicate interpretation of our results, particularly those pertaining to the firm’s
exit choice.
~I nRitter and Taylor (1998) we argue that seniority-based layoff policies can function
as a partial bonding mechanism when labor demand is stochastic.
5in t — 1 and A~in t, the probability of retention i nti s
X~1=min{~,1}.
We assume that laid-offworkers lose their entire bond, that is, they get no severance
pay. This assumption is implemented by setting the gross return on the bond to
zero. We discuss this assumption in more detail below.
The signal reports = 0 with probability d given e = 0. Otherwise = ~h, If
= 0, the worker is fired. Fired workers also lose their entire bond.
1.1 The Probability Distribution of Continued Employment
We begin our analysis of this model by considering the problem faced by the
worker in stage 4. Suppose J is the index of the minimum operating state, that is,
the firm shuts down when A < A~.Workers treat J as a parameter and recognize
that .Xjj = 0 forj < J. When A~< A3 < A~,0 < )*~~
3 < 1. With the production
function and demand curve we have chosen,
1 —11
A c~+’i—~’i(~) ,
The two sources ofuncertainty forworkers (shocksto the firm and the random-
izing device that determines which workers get laid off) induce another, more com-
plex Markov chain that describes the stochastic structure of the worker’s problem.
We promise the reader that the complexity introduced in the next two paragraphs
is repaid with considerable subsequent simplification.
Let A” be the S x S matrix containing ~ (for a minimum operating state
Aj) and let ® denote element by element multiplication. Our assumptions on the




6where the identity matrix is S x S. Subsequently, we suppress the J superscript
where this causes no ambiguity. The first S states correspond to different values
of A, conditional on past termination of the job. (These states function as a single
absorbing state in terms of the economics, but carrying around S separate but
equivalent absorbing states keeps the form of Q simple.) The second S states
represent different demand states, given that the worker retains her job. A typical
element of the lower right submatrix is ~ i.e., the probability that demand
goes from A~to A3 times the probability that the worker retains her job in this
transition. A typical element of the lower left submatrix is p~jj (1 — )~ij);the same
demand shift, but the worker loses her job.
States S+1 through S+J — 1 correspond to the events that A < A,, (the firm
exits) and the worker retains her job, and therefore do not occur. Because those
states cannot be reached, they have no influence on the solution of the worker’s
problem. It will, nonetheless, be convenient, subsequently, as we vary J, to keep
these states in the matrix in an appropriate way. We do so by setting to 0 every
element except the diagonals in the S+1 through S+J — 1 rows and columns. The
diagonals equal 1. In other words, the lower-right partition of Q has the following
structure:
AJ®M=(~ ~).
For transitions within ~ (which is (S — J + 1) x (S — J + 1)), the worker continues
to be employed. All of the other nonzero elements in the last S — J + 1 rows of Q
represent transitions to unemployment. Informally, the structure of the transition
matrix faced by the worker is:






For the remainder ofthe paper, state indices will refer to the 2S states in Q, except
when referring to A or elements of M.
1.2 No-Shirking Condition
We denote the expected value of the unemployed state by ~ Since Vu~does
not depend on the firm’s state, we are implicitly assuming that a worker laid off
by this firm is no more likely than any other unemployed worker to be employed
by this firm in the future. The bond posted in state i is B~(with the convention
that B~= 0 for i < S+ J). At this stage we are considering an arbitrary B~.The
gross rate ofreturn on a bond posted in state i and repaid in state k we denote R~k.
Our assumption that workers get no severance pay implies R~k= 0 if the worker
is laid off (that is, k < S + J). The worker’s expected lifetime utility in state i is
V, if the worker chooses e = eh and V,°if she chooses e = 0. By convention we let
V~= V9
= VU for i < S + J. Then for an employed worker (S + J < i < 2S),
Vi = W~ — eh — B~ + /3 [Vk + R~k B~], (1)
V°= W~ — B~ + d/3VU + (1— d)/3~q~k[Vk+R~kB~]. (2)
The first of these equations says, for example, that a worker who does not shirk







J S S+J /still employed) receives current utility W~ — eh.5 With probability qjk, next period’s
state is k. If k < 5, the worker’s job is terminated (Vk = VU and R~k = 0). In the
second equation a shirker is detected and loses the job with probability d.
We are interested in wage-bond policies which induce workers to provide high
effort. To derive no-shirking conditions, we consider a one-period deviation from a
high-effort policy. This is why Vk rather than V~appears on the right-hand side
of (2). Using one-period deviations is necessary to allow the possibility that, for a
given wage profile, shirking will be optimal in some states but not others.
Risk-neutral workers require that the expected return on the bond equal the
risk-free rate RF. The vector of returns promised when the state is currently i, R~,
must satisfy
= ~ (3)
where Q2~is the ith row of Q, and i > S +J (the firm is operating and the worker
is employed).
As a notational device, define z (1 — /3)Vu. If workers losing jobs can imme-
diately find low-effort work, the competitive wage will be z, but this interpretation
is not necessary, except in determining the behavior of a firm that does not face
agency problems. Let V = [V1,. .., V~s]’,V°= [V1
0,. .., V~°,~]’, B = [B1,. .., B~s]’,
U = [z,. .. , z, ~ — en,. .., W25
— eh}~,and U° = [z,. ..,z, W~+j, .. . , Was]’.
Equation (3) implies that ~i q~kR~kB~ = RF’B~ in (1) and (2). Using this obser-
vation, (1) and (2) can be written for all i as6
V=U_B+/3RFB+/3QV (4)
V°= U°— B + d/3VU + (1 — d)/3RFB + (1— d)/3QV
where V’~is a 25 x 1 vector in which every element is VU.
~ Our convention is that Vj is the worker’s expected utility after the bond is posted.
6 Most ofthe equations in this system areredundant: V~L= z + /3V’~’.The tractability
ofthis system is the reason for all ofthe rigamarole in defining Q and z.
9Suppose that the firm offers an arbitrary implicit contract {w, B}. Then the
worker will provide effort level ~ whenever employed if
0 < V — V°= (U — U°)— d/3V’~’+d/3RFB + d/3QV. (5)
2. EFFICIENCY WAGES
A pure efficiency-wage model assumes that B,, = 0 for all i. Only the wage is
used to elicit effort. The no-shirking condition (5) reduces to
0~(U_UO)_d/3VU+d/3QV, (6)
Setting B = 0 in (4) implies V = (I—/3Q)~U.Using this in (6) yields the following
useful form of the no-shirking condition:7
U=(1_/3)VU+ [I(/3Q)_l]UU (7)
Since the firm faces neither entry nor exit costs, it exits when current profits
are 0. Since the profits ofthe firm depend on the wages it must pay, and the wages
it must pay in turn depend on the exit state, the exit decision is not trivial.
Fortunately, however, (7) does not depend on the firm’s profits, only the exit
state. Given minimum operating demand A,,, the last S — J + 1 equations in
(7) determine the S — J + 1 wages Wj,. ..,W~. (Recall that labor demand and,
therefore, Q (via A) depend on the current wage, so the system is nonlinear.)
‘~ For numerical purposes the relevant portion of (4) is the last S — J + 1 equations,
which can be written
U=(1_/3)Vu_ ~+®~‘~
where M and A are the (S — J + 1) x (S — J + 1) submatrices in the lower right
corners ofM and A. Because ofthe block-diagonal structure of Q, (A®M)~equals
the corresponding submatrix ofQ~1.
10The followingsimple solution procedure presents itself: 1) For each possible J,
find the vector ofwages W” that solves (7). 2) Calculate profits in J and J — 1. 3)
The firm’s minimum operating state is the smallest J such that profits are negative
in state J — 1 and nonnegative in J.8
2.1 Numerical Solutions
The most important choice for our numerical solutions is the transition matrix
M. Following Tauchen (1988), we use a class of matrices for which the Markov
chain approximates an AR(1) process in A with normal innovations.
A(t)=pA(t— 1)+ (t),
where (t) N(A,of). Tauchen’s procedure constructs a transition matrix for a
Markov chain whose domain spans a fixed number ofstandard deviations of A on
either side of its mean. We use four standard deviations and 301 states. Values
of A range from 0.0001 to 5.6.~ The unconditional mean of the process is state
151 in every case. We experimented with a variation in which the Markov chain
approximates an AR(1) process in ln(A). This choice does not affect the transition
matrix, only the prices that correspond to the states. Results were broadly similar
in this log-normal case. Results were also very similar in the case where 0 rather
than A follows a Markov chain.
We used two main criteria for choosing parameters. First, the range of A
considered must include the firm’s shutdown level. Second, we chose parameters so
8 With a large number of firms facing independent and identical stochastic processes
for A, V’~would be constant and exogenous to the firm, but endogenous to labor
market equilibrium. It would still depend, however, on an assumed level of utility of
unemployed workers, and would, therefore, still be effectively a free parameter, so we
do not solve for labor market equilibrium. Our qualitative conclusions do not depend
on the value of V’~”.
~I nFigures 2 and 3 which compare stochastic processes, we vary Tauchen’s procedure
by forcing the range of values of A to remain the same as in our baseline case. This
effectively makesthe approximation better for one process, but with a finestatespace,
the difference is unimportant.
11that the shutdown level in the baseline was below the mean. Our baseline solution
in Figure 1 uses p = 0.7, o~= 0.5, d = 0.25, /3 = 0.97, ~ = 2, a = 0.67, 0 = 1,
F=0.25,e’~=1,andz=5.
The solution shown in Figure 1 is typical. Mean reversion in the stochastic
process for A means that workers need to worry about job loss both when demand
is strong and when the firm is weak. When the firm’s demand is very low, there is a
significant chance ofexit. Even though this would be a move away from the mean,
the expected loss from the event is high. Workers must therefore be paid a substan-
tial premium in these circumstances if the value ofthe job is to be maintained. The
figure also indicates that the state in which a neoclassical firm would shut down
(zero profits with W = z+ eh~)is below the optimal shutdown for an efficiency-wage
firm. This is partly because efficiency wages are always higher than the competitive
level z +~ even in a deterministic model. But here, the firm faces a dilemma: As
A approaches the shutdown state, wages rise dramatically. Even without this effect,
the usual efficiency wage premium would cause the firm to exit at an inefficiently
high A. This “endgame effect” induces the firm to exit even sooner. Since there are
no entry or exit costs the firm need not worry about preserving any real options, so
this effect comes exclusively from the efficiency-wage mechanism.
It seems paradoxical at first that workers also require a wage premium when
demand is unusually strong, but a bit of reflection reveals this to be a consequence
ofmean reversion. When A is far above its mean, workers recognize the likelihood
of significant layoffs as it drifts back toward its normal level.10 Figure 2 illustrates
this effect by comparing three solutions with different degrees of mean reversion,
holding the unconditional variance of A constant (that is, we adjust u~so that
= o~/(1— p2) does not change). With a lower p (more mean reversion) wages
10 This effect is magnified when A has log-normal innovations because a given degree
of mean reversion in ln(A) corresponds to larger movements in A and thus larger
changes in labor demand and larger layoffs when A is above its mean.
12rise more steeply as A rises above its mean. When p is lower, the probability of
exit is lower in operating states below the mean, since mean reversion “pulls” the
state away from the shutdown point. Mean reversion “pulls” better states towards
shutdown, but this has an insignificant impact on the wage because the probability
ofa negative innovation largeenough to induce exit is very small.11 For lower values
ofp, therefore, wages rise less steeply as the firm nears shutdown. This also means
that the exit state is lower—closer to the efficient point—with small p. Roughly
midway between shutdown and the mean, wages can be especially low for lower p
because the probability of layoffs not associated with exit is low (since these do not
occur when A increases, which it is likely to do), while the possibility of immediate
exit is fairly remote.
The skewed U-shape of the product demand—wage profile suggests that the
firm might find it worthwhile to offer to limit variations in employment, that is, to
hoard labor, in order to control wage costs when demand is either especially low or
especially high. This is true in a limited sense in the present model: Labor demand
is less responsive to the state in the efficiency-wage model than in a neoclassical
model, except near exit.
We assumed in Section 1 that the firm stays on its marginal revenue product
curve (the usual assumption in efficiency-wage models), but a firm might want
to lower the efficiency wage by promising to further limit employment variation
by operating off the marginal revenue product curve in some states. Modeling that
insight requires careful attention to strategic considerations, however, since the firm
always wants cheat in the short run by operating on its value of marginal product
~ If A were i.i.d., the probability of shutdown, conditional on At would exactly equal
the unconditional probability, so a low price in t would indicate nothing about the
likelihood ofshutdown in t+1. This does not mean that wages are constant: Although
the probability of exit is constant, the probability of layoff is higher for higher A.
Thus, paradoxically, with a very high degree of mean reversion (low p) workers can
feel more secure when their firm is near exit than when it is booming.
13curve as we assume here. To do so would take us far afield. Here we simply note
that: (1) The solution we use here is the subgame perfect equilibrium in which
workers do not believe the firm will ever resist the temptation to move employment
onto its value of marginal product curve. (2) The firm cannot use a labor-hoarding
strategy to completely eliminate the rise in wages near shutdown; there must be
some A below which the firm fires workers, and when the probability of this event
rises, so will wages.
As shown in Figure 3, the main effect of increasing o~,is to increase the wage
premium paid near shutdown and, since higher wages make the firm less profitable
in a given state, exit occurs at a higher level of A. These effects are driven by
the fact that a higher innovation variance raises the probability of crossing a given
exit threshold from any given state. The solutions converge for higher values of A
because the probability differential becomes trivial in states far from exit.
Variations in the monitoring parameter d, shown in Figure 4, change the so-
lution in the same way predicted by deterministic efficiency-wage models, but the
greater probability ofjob loss when A is either very low or very high increases the
differential paid to workers in low-d firms. Low d also distorts the firm’s exit deci-
sion more than a high d. The technology of monitoring workers is something that
is, in reality, at least partly endogenous. As we discuss below, this is a particularly
interesting margin for a firm that is near exit, so the extra sensitivity ofwages to d
near exit and the sensitivity of the exit threshold itself are of special interest.
2.2 Implications for Compensation Patterns
There are two additional implications for compensation patterns that are worth
attention. First, in this model wages are a function not merely ofjob characteristics
(d, for example), but also firm characteristics (a, 0, and the stochastic process for
A). The importance of this observation stems from a weakness of standard effi-
14ciency wage models: The wage dispersion predicted by the theory does not accord
well with certain aspects of empirically observed wage patterns. In the standard
deterministic shirking model, wage differentials result from differences in the diffi-
culty of monitoring worker effort in a particular task. Thus workers performing a
particularjob ought to be paid about the same in all industries and by all firms. Em-
pirically, however, there tends to be a high cross-occupation correlation of wages in
industries and firms; firms that pay high wages in one job are often observed to pay
high wages in all jobs (Katz and Summers, 1989; Dickens and Katz, 1987; Groshen,
1991). It appears that the rents some workers earn are related to the characteris-
tics ofthe firm, not merely characteristics of thejob. Our model predicts that the
nature ofthe firm’sproduct market and/or its idiosyncratic productivity (0) exerts
systematic influence over compensation.
Second, although we are skeptical of the prediction that firms on the verge of
bankruptcy pay extraordinarily high wages, it does seem plausible that firms that
can offer generally better future prospects (because current demand or productivity
is strong, for example) find themselves able to pay lower wages. To the extent that
demand or productivity shocks are correlated across firms so that weak demand
tends to indicate a weak economy overall, the high wages associated with weak
demand impart a countercyclical impulse to real wages. When the source of uncer-
tainty in our model is VU rather than A, real wages are procyclical, as suggested
by simple comparative statics on deterministic efficiency-wage models. There are
thus opposing forces working on the cyclicality of the real wage, one of which is
neglected by deterministic models.
153. PERFORMANCE BONDS IN A MODIGLIANI-MILLER WORLD
We now turn to the case where agency problems can be costlessly resolved by
use of performance bonds. After the bond is posted it becomes a liability of the
firm and an asset in the worker’s portfolio. The rate of return on the bond must,
therefore, meet some portfolio equilibrium conditions. In general, the nature ofthe
conditions depends on the nature of financial markets and the risk preferences of
the worker. In this paper we pursue the matter in the simplest way by assuming
risk-neutral workers, giving us the single rate-of-return condition, (3).
In this section we assume further that the firm operates in an essentially fric-
tionless environment, where the value ofthe firm and the economy-wide equilibrium
are essentiallyunaffected by the firm’s use ofperformance bonding. In particular we
assume that (1) both entry and exit are costless, (2) financial markets are complete
and efficient from both the firm’s and the worker’s points of view, (3) there are no
transactions costs in either labor or financial markets, and (4) there is no income
taxation. Failure to meet any of these conditions is likely to make bonding a costly
way to resolve the agency problem.
3.1 No-Shirking Condition
If a firm uses exclusively bonds to regulate effort, the no-shirking condition
(5) can be solved explicitly for B. First, the wage is determined by external labor
market equilibrium and therefore does not depend on the firm’s state. Since we are
assuming no macroeconomic uncertainty the wage is constant. In this full-bonding
solution, the worker gets no surplus from the job so that V = VU. Let bond B~
be just large enough to induce e = ~ in state i. Exploiting the fact that Q is a
probability matrix and therefore has an eigenvector [1, 1,. . ., 1]’ and corresponding
eigenvalue 1, we have
U°-U
B RFd/3’
16For states in which the worker is employed (i> S + J), the bond is constant:
~
Bi=RFd/3.
For i < S + J, U°= U = z, so B~= 0 as expected. Thus, all of the effects of
uncertainty work through the rate of return (equation (3)) rather than the size of
the bond.
3.2 The Structure of Returns
The theorybehind performance-bonding models leaves extensive indeterminacy
about the structure of returns on the bond.12 Under risk-neutrality, the firm and
workers can agree on any pattern of state-specific payoffs that satisfies (3). The
logic of bonding limits the range of assets the firm can force the worker to hold,
but does not uniquely determine the state-specific payoffs. It is necessary to make
some further restrictions in order to construct specific bonding schemes.
As mentioned above, we maintain two core hypotheses about the structure of
returns: (1) R~k= 0 if k < J, that is, a worker loses her entire bond if the firm
exits; and (2) R~k= 0 if J < k < 5, that is, she loses her entire bond if laid off,
even when the firm does not exit. We separate the two because the first is critical
to much of our argument, yet uncontroversial.
The second assumption is probably unrealistically strong, since layoffs may
be temporary and severance pay is sometimes observed. Most of our qualitative
results would be retained ifthere were complete loss ofthe bond only when the firm
exits. We think, however, that for many bonding arrangements discussed in the
literature and their empirical counterparts, it is reasonable to assume that any job
loss results in some capital loss for the worker. Lazear (1979) assumes complete loss
for workers who lose their jobs because the firm shuts down (which he subsumes
12 Lazear (1981) noted that this indeterminacy makes various lifetime earnings profiles
indistinguishable on a theoretical basis.
17in an exogenous probability of “cheating”), but argues that severance pay equal to
the accumulated value of deferred compensation could allow efficient separations of
other types. This may be a significant consideration for firms (Lazear argues that
it helps explain early retirement incentives). Nonetheless, we see three reasons to
suspect that severance pay arrangements do not generally compensate workers fully
forjob loss.
First, any repayment ofbonds upon termination would require a verifiable dis-
tinction between dismissal for cause and any other layoff. This seems inconsistent
with the spirit of implicit contracts; firms would prefer to hold bonds in escrow
accounts, obviating most of the moral-hazard problems they ordinarily must face.
Second, the only systematic data on severance pay we are aware of show severance
pay in collective bargaining agreements rising with seniority (Pita, 1996), rather
than rising and then falling as intertemporal bonding models would imply. If these
agreements are efficient, the relationship between tenure and severance payments
should still be hump-shaped, with surplus shared in ways that do not distort sep-
aration incentives. Third, workers clearly dislike involuntary separations, cx post,
though, of course, this could be because they lose claim to rents from some source
such as union power or efficiency wages.
We add a third assumption that pins down a simple return structure. Suppose
the firm promises that, conditional on continued employment, bonds posted today
in state i pay the same return in all future states k, that is, R~k= R2 for all








18The right-hand side is the rate the firm must pay on ordinary debt liabilities, as-
suming the firm has no valuable assets at exit. (Recall that the ~ujj are transition
probabilities for A.) As the firm’s situation deteriorates, its ordinary corporate
debt takes on junk status (provided the state is positively autocorrelated), but the
worker’s claims are even less attractive, since (1) they can lose their jobs before exit
and (2) they have no claim on residual assets of the firm.
On the surface it might appear unlikely that there are no substantive conse-
quences to the existence of such dramatically structured liabilities, but in a fric-
tionless environment the Modigliani-Miller logic applies: the financial structure of
the firm in general and the structure of this security (the performance bond) in
particular do not affect the value of the firm or general equilibrium allocations of
resources. Performance bonds achieve first-best outcomes.
3.3 Potential Frictions and Distortions
In the remainder of the paper we treat the performance-bond model as a fric-
tionless baseline, but since controversies about performance bonds have rarely been
framedin an explicitly stochastic setting. Abrief digression that highlights the spe-
cial features of performance bonds seems worthwhile. A number of these features
appear particularly germane to whether performance bonds can distort the firm’s
behavior. First, asymmetric information can makebonding costly. In an earlier pa-
per (Ritter and Taylor, 1994) we argued that when firms have private information
about their own prospects, “safe” firms—those with higher probability of contin-
ued employment—have an incentive to use a costly signal, namely efficiency wages,
to distinguish themselves. This line of reasoning is similar to the signaling role of
dividends hypothesized by Bhattacharya (1979).
Second, since workers have no legal recourse if the firm does not honor its
obligation, the security issued to workers is more similar to preferred stock than
19to debt. Accordingly, performance bonds would not have the salutary effect on
managerial effort that has been attributed to debt (Jensen, 1988).
Third, the security is dissimilar to ordinary securities in that workers have
no legally enforceable claim to, say, high wages late in their careers. This makes
these claims particularly susceptible to opportunistic behavior on the part of the
firm through “downsizing” or “restructuring.” These activities appear to be the
labor market equivalent of Chapter 11 proceedings. This is just the old moral
hazardcriticism ofperformancebonding dressed up in new clothing, but the analogy
highlights an useful observation: Whether layoffs result from moral hazard or are
simply the realization of contingencies that were mutually understood, cx ante,
there is likely to be costly conflict and negotiation surrounding them, just as there
is costly conflict surrounding Chapter 11 proceedings.
Fourth, risk aversion will make bonding costly, ifworkers cannot insure against
loss ofthe bond. Since the reason for thebond in the first place is moral hazard, this
seems most plausible. In fact, the worker bears more risk than the firm’s creditors;
eventhe least risky performance bond, priced in (8), is stochastically dominated (in
the second order) by ordinary debt.
3.4 Implications for Compensation Patterns
Bonding schemes that are taken seriously as models ofcompensation (e.g., life-
cycle incentives or tournaments) embed the posting and repayment of bonds in the
stream of compensation. In this section, therefore, we identify wages plus net bond
repayments with the term “observed compensation.” We assume that the firm pays
a gross return ofR~to each employee it continues to employ.
Our main point is intuitively clear from (3), though we give a numerical illus-
tration in Figure 5, using the same parameter values as the baseline efficiency-wage
solution. Ifthe state is positively autocorrelated, a firm facing low demand, say A,,,
20has poor future prospects. In particular, for most natural stochastic specifications
the probability of exit tomorrow, given demand A., today, ~ ,ujk) is higher
than the probability of exit tomorrow if today’s demand is A,,~10~ /~J+1o,k).
This is certainly true, forexample, whenwe structure M so that A(t) approximates
a Gaussian AR(1) process. Since the worker loses her bond whenever there is a
transition to Ak < A,,, she will require higher returns when posting a bond in J
than when posting a bond in J + 10: ~s+~ > ~s+j+io~13
If today’s state is poor, it is likely that yesterday’s state was also poor, so ob-
served compensation today is likely to be high. The opposite is true for good states.
The slope of an intertemporal compensation path depends on its history. Compen-
sation paths will slope downward for firms recovering from near-death experiences
(including, possibly, birth), since the rate of return declines (with a one-period lag)
as the state gets farther away from exit. Firms on the decline see steeply rising
compensation. In principle, more complicated repayment patterns, such as those
proposed by Lazear, can be treated as portfolios of bonds posted at different dates
with varying maturities and returns, but the indeterminacy mentioned above makes
none seem compelling (since life-cycle incentives are not meaningful in our model).
Two basic messages would not change with more complicated patterns. First,
the promised rate ofreturn always exceeds that promised to ordinary bond holders.
Second, firms that ask employees to post bonds whenthey are likely to be lost must
offer higher rates ofreturn. In short, observed compensation tends to be high when
the firm is on the ropes.
13 Because of the general indeterminacy of the pattern of bond repayments, it is possible
to construct bonding schemes that do not have this property, for example, R~kB =
7i~kwhere ir~is the value of the firm’s profits in state k and ‘yj is the fraction of
them promised in state i to a worker who remains with the firm in the next period.
In this model ~yjturns out to be very high for bad states and low for good states.
Observed compensation is low in bad states because Irk is low, but correspondingly
enormous in good states. The time path of compensation is also very complex.
214. THE DYING-FIRM DILEMMA
The influence of compensation on the exit margin and the influence of exit
on compensation are of interest in their own right, but they open a deeper set
of intriguing issues, which we begin to address in this section. The deeper issues
arise because the prospect of immediate liquidation can trigger a search forways to
preserve value in the firm.
The nature ofthe situation is asfollows: Firms sometimes find themselves per-
ilously close to shutdown and, taking literally the predictions of our model, they
must pay particularly high compensation, ifjobs are to remain sufficiently valuable
to induce high effort. In the efficiency-wage setting, rising wages reduce profits
rapidly, and exit occurs when profits are zero. Although we find this logic com-
pelling, the implication that firms rapidly increase compensation when they are on
the verge of bankruptcy strikes us as generally counterfactualJ4 Such a situation
is obviously rather fluid, and outcomes vary from firm to firm, but two broad ap-
proaches seem to offer insight into what actually happens. First, firms are able to
adjust on margins we have suppressed in the interest of (relative) simplicity. Second,
a critical situation might present opportunities for some form of “renegotiation” of
implicit contracts.
4.1 Adjusting on Other Margins
Our model makes the stark assumption that firms find it efficient to induce the
same effort level, regardless of the state. A more general formulation would allow
continuous effort choices. In the efficiency-wage case, the higher wage necessary
in bad states would make a lower effort level optimal. The reduction in effort is
accomplished simply by reducing the wage. This story accords well with the obser-
14 There is evidence that workers in industries that have high unemployment risk receive
wage premiums (Abowd and Ashenfelter, 1981). This evidence is related to the point
at hand, but we know of no systematic longitudinal evidence that firms tend to
increase wages as they near bankruptcy.
22vation that morale tends to deteriorate in dying firms. It is also possible that when
market fundamentals are particularly weak, the marginal value of effort declines
for some firms.’5 In the performance-bonding case the compensating-differentials
portion of the wage would decline, and the total payment on the bond would be
smaller, since the bond necessary to prevent shirking would now be smaller. Thus,
a continuous-effort generalization could quantitatively reduce the large rise in com-
pensation observed in states near exit.
This generalization would not, however, alter the qualitative conclusion unless
the firm chooses to adjust exclusively on the effort margin. Similar reasoning would
apply if a firm could pay to adjust d at the margin by, say, hiring more supervisors.
Moreover, a firm using onlybonds does not adjust on either margin unless the value
of marginal effort is negatively correlated with the state, allowing it to adjust the
compensating differential paid for effort.
Along muchthe same lines, a firm that uses its compensation schemeto regulate
turnover might be willing to tolerate higher turnover to save on wages. Again, the
story accords well with observation: firms with an uncertain future tend to exhibit
high turnover.
4.2 Can Workers in Dying Firms Make Concessions?
Though both efficiency-wage and performance-bond firms must, in bad states,
provide relatively high compensation to resolve the effort regulation problem, there
is a fundamental difference between these cases. No meaningful concessions are
possible in frictionless performance-bond firms, but in principle they are possible in
an efficiency-wage firm.
Consider first a performance-bond firm that has the ill fortuneto arrive in a zero
profit state, say (J — 1). Workers who lose their bonds will be unhappy about this
15 For example, an airline facing a reduction in the demand for seats might find it
optimal to allow agents at the ticket counter to work at more leisurely pace.
23turn ofevents, but there is no action that either party would be willing to take that
would reverse this outcome. The firm has zero value under the existing implicit
contract, which specified R~,,,_,= 0. If the firm agreed to partial repayment of
the workers’ bond (thus preserving some of the job’s value), the value of the firm
becomes negative. Workers are, ofcourse, unwilling to accept a negative return R’ <
R~,,,_,= 0, since that would make the value of their jobs negative. Furthermore,
since no restructuring of the firm’s liabilities can change the value of the firm,
more complicated concessions (deferring repayment until demand exceeds Aj+,,
for example) will also fail to change the bottom line. This is simply the Modigliani-
Miller logic applied to performance bonds.
Matters are quite different for a firm paying efficiency wages. Like a perfor-
mance-bond firm, an efficiency-wage firm will want to shut down whenever profits
are negative, and this is an unhappy state of affairs for workers. Here, however,
there is potential for a “continuation game.”
Suppose, for the sake ofargument that in state (J — 1) the value of the firm is
slightly negative. (Note that the value ofJ is greater than in the performance-bond
example.) In (J — 1) the value ofjobs is positive and possibly quite large. In state
(J — 1) profits in the absence of an agency problem would approximately equal the
large efficiency-wage premium times labor demand; this is what distorts the firm’s
exit choice. The distortion comes from the separation of control rights over exit
from claims to the returns to continued operation. In principle, workers would be
willing to offer the firm a side payment to keep the firm in operation, since, if A,,
is less than the mean, there is a better-than-even chance that next period’s state
will be better. In essence, workers would be willing to buy call options on their
jobs. If the state were J — 2, the option would be more expensive, and have a lower
expected return.
We have just described a theoretically feasible transaction. The exact na-
24ture of the equilibrium transaction would depend on the variety of factors affecting
the bargaining strength of workers and employers and the bargaining environment.
These factors include, at a minimum, the flexibility of monitoring arrangements,
the nature of the underlying fundamentals (the likelihood of a firm come-back, for
example), and the structure of information.
Explicit lump-sum payments are as likely to be troublesome here as they are
for performance bonds. Consequently, side payments would need to be embedded in
the compensation stream, just as Lazear embeds bonds in upward-sloping earnings
profiles. Doing so complicates matters, however. If, for example, the side payments
took the form of simple wage concessions, the wage path would violate the no-
shirking constraints.
Workers and owners in a dying efficiency-wage firm thus face the following
dilemma: On the one hand, resolution of the effort regulation problem requires
that the value of jobs be maintained. On the other hand, the very actions the
firm takes to keepjobs valuable—higher wages—only hasten the demise of the firm.
There is potential for a mutually beneficial deal, but the new implicit contract must
continue to be incentive-compatible.
4.3 Solving the Agency Problem in a Dying Firm
The previous section makes the case that firms and workers in an efficiency-
wage firm have an incentive to construct mechanisms, however crude, that allow
workers to make concessions while maintaining the incentive to provide effort.
When such mechanisms can be found they will weaken, perhaps even reverse, the
first-order prediction ofour model—that compensation must rise as firms approach
bankruptcy.
There is one obvious nonmonetary way for workers to make concessions in a
dying firm: employee monitoring. In any efficiency-wage firm, employers will want
25to adopt practices that make worker monitoring more precise, since this serves
to reduce the efficiency wage premium, as illustrated by Figure 4. Workers will
generally resist such efforts because more effective monitoring reduces employee
rents.
Workers’ incentives are different, though, in a firm on the edge of bankruptcy.
When the alternative is the loss ofvaluable jobs, workers want improved monitoring
exactly because it would lower the wage; improved monitoring effects an incentive-
compatible monetary concession. (Figure 4 also demonstrates this—increasing d
lowers the exit threshold.) The change in monitoring can happen in one of two
ways. First, employees may simply lower resistance to changes the employer wishes
to make. They may make such concessions even if they are irreversible, reducing
future as well as current wages; workers accept a capital loss on their jobs.
Second, workers may find it desirable to coordinate on higher-effort, in effect
improving self-monitoring. Since this involves a difficultfree-rider problem, it would
need to be implemented through mechanisms such as changing group work norms
or cooperation with management on institutions such as quality circles or other
participatory work arrangements. Self-monitoring is likely to dissipate if the firm
returns to health, since workers’ incentives revert to normal.
As we mentioned in the previous section, simple wage concessions are not
incentive-compatible. On the other hand, accepting lower compensation now in re-
turn for higher compensation later, contingent on recovery of the firm is incentive-
compatible for the worker. The difficulty, of course, is that this scheme is not
incentive-compatible for the firm, which has an incentive to renege when the firm is
again healthy. The obvious solution is to give the worker contingent claims on the
firm’s future profits—equity or options. This transaction could take the extreme
form of selling the firm to its employees at a price less than the collective value of
their jobs.
26Indeed, employee buyouts are a phenomenon often associated with firms in
difficult circumstances. Since there are large transactions costs and at least partial
transfer of control rights, they must serve some purpose beyond a mechanism to
induce continued operation. We offer four conjectures. First, as the previous para-
graph argues, buyouts may simply enforce promised repayment of current wage
concessions. It is not clear, however, why a simple transfer of shares or options
would not accomplish the same objective more cheaply.
Second, an equity stake combined with control rights would help to reinforce
workers’ efforts at group-monitoring by reducing the size of the free-rider problem.
Third, if workers’ information about their ability to successfully self-monitor
is better than the firm’s, their willingness to accept an equity stake in exchange
for wage concessions might be a credible signal that self-monitoring can reduce the
agency problem, allowing wage concessions to be profit maximizing.
Fourth, Ben-Nur and Jun (1996) make a complementary argument, that man-
agement may have private information about the state of the firm.16 Workers
understand that firms always want give-backs, even in good states. The firm’s will-
ingness to sell equity to workers at a very low price serves as a credible signal that
the firm is indeed in a bad state. Revealing a bad state actuallyraises the efficiency
wage, however, so the net effect of management’s offer to sell the firm is not clear.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Employers’ efforts to resolve agency problems often entail the use of various
mechanisms that give workers’ jobs positive value. Because the value ofjobs is tied
inextricably to job stability, there is an unavoidable link between compensation
policies and uncertainty in a firm’s environment. Our paper studies this link explic-
itly. Employment and exit are determined endogenously. We study efficiency-wage
16 This is not the case in the symmetric information model we use in this paper.
27and performance-bond compensation strategies encompassed by a general model.
The results ofthis exercise indicate: (1) Compensation levels depend systemat-
ically on characteristics ofthe firm and its environment, not solely on characteristics
ofthe worker and the job. (2) Thepredicted cyclical properties ofwages are altered
by these links (relative to deterministic models). In particular, we find a counter-
cyclical impulse to compensation. (3) Both variants of our theory predict high
compensation when firm fundamentals are weak. In the efficiency-wage variant,
distorted exit choices are a corollary.
In general terms, valuable-jobs models of compensation give economic con-
tent to the common public rhetoric about workers as “stakeholders” in firms. The
implications of efficiency-wage and performance-bond models differ dramatically,
however, when it comes to attempts to preserve these “stakes.” In the friction-
less Modigliani-Miller world, where performance bonding costlessly resolves agency
problems, the fact that some of the firm’s debt is held by workers has no meaning-
ful effect on any facet ofthe firm’s operation; liquidation of valuable jobs is always
efficient. In contrast, in an efficiency-wage firm, the prospect of shutdown is likely
to trigger a struggle to retain jobs that have positive value, even when the value
of the firm to shareholders is zero. Although the mechanisms through which this
struggle is played out in troubled real-world firms appear quite diverse, an attempt
to integrate these mechanisms into an overall model of compensation seems likely
to be an informative avenue of research.
In the several decades since Modigliani and Miller’s original work (1958),
economists have come to realize that understanding firms’ financial decisions in
a stochastic setting often depends on understanding sophisticated responses to the
various market imperfections that firms sometimes encounter. A similar observation
pertains to firms’ employment practices. In a broad sense we regard this paper as
a first step toward a full understanding of the implications of that observation.
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